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STATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: AN ADHERENCE TO TRADITION
LEONARD F. MANNING*
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'

Only eleven years after Secretary Seward had certified that the fourteenth amendment had become a part of the Constitution, Mr. Justice

Strong speaking for the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte
Virginia2 and speaking of the due process and equal protection clauses
and of the thirteenth amendment 3 said,
One great purpose of these amendments was to raise the colored race from that
condition of inferiority and servitude in which most of them had previously stood,
into perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of
the States. They were intended to take away all possibilif of oppression by law
4
because of race or color.

When is equality perfect? When can we be satisfied that we have
removed "all possibility of oppression"? Most certainly the language of
Mr. Justice Strong is of the "liberal" tradition, what Professor Morse
-we might reasonably infer from the preceding article-might label a
"policy" declaration. And it is equally as certain that the Justice drew a
radius for this protective circle far longer than any ever measured off
by the Congress of the United States or ever actually recognized by any
state or federal judiciary. The language of the Court in Ex parte
5
Virginia underscores the consummate sophistry of Plessy v. Ferguson,
* Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.,
1. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
3. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
4. 100 U.S. at 344-45. Mr. Justice Strong mentions only the civil rights of the colored race. The fourteenth amendment is not limited to the proscription of racial discrimination. The Justice was speaking only in the context of the case then before the
Court, a case wherein a state court judge excluded Negroes from jury service. Ex parte
Virginia is discussed more fully infra p. 204. The due process and equal protection
clauses, quoted at the outset, make no mention -of the colored race or racial discrimination. "Persons" are protected. The dauses protect all persons of any class or race,
whether they be Arab, Japanese, or Chinese, Jews, Christians or atheists, aliens or
citizens, residents or nonresidents, men or women, individuals or corporations. See, e.g.,
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1885); County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 Fed. 385 (C.C.
D. Cal. 1883).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy v. Ferguson established the "separate but equal" doc-
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and accentuates the genuine wisdom of Brown v. Board of Educ. What
was true in 1879 when the court decided Ex parte Virginia was true in
1896 when it decided Plessy-that the fourteenth amendment required
equality of persons, not of school facilities, or transportation facilities or
recreational facilities. Indeed, it was obvious in 1938 when the Court
announced Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada' that Plessy was destined
for eventual reversal. For it was palpably unwise and contradictory for
a court, which disdained to become involved with "the witty diversities
of the law of sales," to sit as an educational epicure and to plunge into
the diversities, the qualifications, the virtues or vices of separate academic
institutions.
If Professor Morse would affix the label of "policy decision" on Brown
v. Board of Educ. then the same stamp must be impressed upon the
"perfect equality" phrasing of Ex parte Virginia. And that is to admit
that Brown does not bespeak a "new liberalism" but rather an old sentiment suggested by 1Vr. Justice Strong over 68 years ago.
That is why, initially at least, I question the validity of Professor
Morse's assertion that recent decisions have avoided "the restriction of
the fourteenth amendment to state action or have attenuated the fiction
of state action" 8 and that "new meanings" have been appended to that
deceptive phrase. If Mr. Justice Strong's language was acceptable to the
Court in 1879 can we speak of the "disintegration of the strict and
conventional interpretation of the fourteenth amendment"? 9 Or is it
accurate to reflect that "policy and interpretation have supplanted application with respect to the fourteenth amendment?"'
I am not certain that I comprehend what Professor Morse means by
"policy" or by "application." If by "application" is meant an adherence
to stare decisis and an adjustment of the due process and equal protection clauses 1 to new situations in reasonable accord with the original
trine, holding that the fourteenth amendment was not violated by racially segregated
state operated schools so long as Negroes were afforded equal, though separate, school
facilities.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This case held that the very segregation of Negroes in schools
apart from whites violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. On
the same day the Court also announced Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), holding
that segregated public schools in the District of Columbia violated the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.
7. 305 U.S. 337 (1938), holding, pursuant to the Plessy doctrine, that the state
of Missouri was required to provide equal law school facilities within the state of Missouri, and that attendance at an out-of-state law school could not be equated with attendance at a Missouri law school.
8. Morse, Policy and the Fourteenth Amendment: A New Semantics, 187 supra.
9. Id. at 200.
10. Ibid.
11. The equal protection clause prohibits only such classification as is unreasonable
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intendment of the fourteenth amendment, I cannot see where "application" has been abandoned by the Court. If by "policy" is meant that a
new liberalism has engulfed the concept of state action, again I demur.
Certainly a "perfect equality of civil rights" is the plain intendment
and the combined effect of the various clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.
WHAT Is

STATE ACTION

It is not Professor Morse's undertaking to re-evaluate Brown v. Board
of Educ. or to revisit Plessy. He has no disagreement, so far as I can
perceive, with the Court's definition of discrimination. He accepts Brown
and is ready to entomb Plessy. But with that acceptance he reminds us
that the due process and equal protection clauses restrict the states alone
and he therefore asks, what is state action? He puts the entire emphasis
on the word "action."' 2 His is a search for a distinction between activity
and inactivity, citing the Civil Rights Cases'3 as posing the distinction
between the antonyms. But the Civil Rights Cases did not so much
distinguish between state action and state inaction as it did between state
activity and private activity.
Overemphasizing the word "action" plays a double fault. It adds a
word to the fourteenth amendment which simply is not there, and it
tends to confuse the real issue. Surely the state has acted, in the conventional use of the word, when its legislature refuses to enact a proposed
civil rights law. And the state has acted when its legislature repeals
existing civil rights legislation. A state acts when a judge finds that there
is no statute and no rule of common law which would require a private
club to admit Negroes. The state, through its agents, has, in the words
or arbitrary. See, e.g., Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Radice v. New York, 264
U.S. 292 (1924); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); cf. Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197 (1923). The due process clause also prohibits unreasonable and arbitrary legislation. Mr. Justice Roberts wrote in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934), "If
the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose,
and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio!. It would
follow, therefore, that any denial of equal protection is ipso facto a denial of due process,
conceding, as indeed we must, that discrimination against a person's political or civil rights
by reason of race, religion or creed is per se unreasonable. Nevertheless, the Court has often
returned to an old practice of separating the two clauses. In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
23 (1948), for example, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, after reasoning that judicial enforcement
of restrictive covenants based on racial discrimination constituted a denial of equal protection, concluded: "Upon full consideration, we have concluded that in these cases the States
have acted to deny petitioners the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Having so decided, we find it unnecessary to consider whether petitioners have also been deprived of property without due process of law ... "
12. Webster defines "action" simply as "the doing of something."
13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See discussion of this decision infra p. 208.
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of Mr. Webster, done something. But is the legislature required by
the Constitution to enact a particular civil rights law, or any civil rights
law at all? Or is it forbidden by the Constitution to repeal existing civil
rights legislation? Or is there any constitutional compulsion imposed
upon the state court to penalize a private invasion of private rights or
enjoin discrimination as between private individuals? "State action"
is a handy phrase but it can be beguiling and misleading. When used
it must be used with caution, for it is quite conceivable that inactivity,
or the refusal to act, or the abdication of sovereign or governmental
functions might violate the fourteenth amendment. Suppose, for example, a particular municipality surrendered itself to the mob hysteria
of white supremacists. Suppose that Negroes, accused of crime, were
systematically subjected to mob-dominated trials conducted by private
individuals and were denied by private groups recourse to judicial processes. Would not the abdication of its policing powers by the state, its
refusal or failure to protect all its citizens alike, be a denial of equal
protection and due process?
Only with the understanding that there might arise situations wherein
a state through its abject inactivity has frustrated the fourteenth amendment and only with the antecedent accord that we require neither authorized nor fulsome nor formal enactments and that we seek not a
plethora of activity, as one judge characterized it, 14 may we ask, what

is state action?
THE LANDMARK DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT

Ex parte Virginia
Section five of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress the "power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
Pursuant thereto Congress adopted legislation which made unlawful the
disqualification, on account of race, color or previous condition of
servitude, of any person from grand or petit jury service. It provided
that "any officer or other person, charged with any duty in the selection
or summoning of jurors, who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen
for the cause aforesaid, shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor. .

. .,"

J. D. Coles, a county court judge of Virginia,

was indicted in the federal court of that state charged with violating the
federal statute. The state statute which authorized Judge Coles to
select jurors made no discrimination against members of the colored race.
It simply required him to prepare a jury list of inhabitants of the
county who were "well qualified to serve as jurors." He, joined by the
14. In re Girard's Estate, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956) (dissenting opinion), rev'd
sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). See note 22 infra.
15. Act of March 1, 1875, c. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336.
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State of Virginia, sought release from fedeial custody by habeas'corpu ;
challenging the constitutionality of the federal statute as applied to state
judicial officers.' 6
The question thus raised was whether Judge Coles' discrimination was
chargeable to the State of Virginia. Was his discrimination a denial by
the state of equal protection of the laws? It is to be particularly noted
that the state statute under which Judge Coles acted was-not discriminatory. Had there been discriminatory legislation pursuant to which Judge
Coles acted the case against him would not have been notable for, at
the same term the Court had already announced Strauder v. West
Virginia,"t holding, what was fairly obvious, that a state statute which
required the exclusion of colored persons from jury service was per se
unconstitutional, and that judicial enforcement of the'state law violated
the equal protection clause. To this the Court, in refusing Judge Coles'
application, added,
A State acts by its legislative,, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act
in no other way. The constitutional pxovision, therefore, must mean that no agency
of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever
by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives another of property,
life, or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name
and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State.
This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning. Then the State
has clothed one of its agents with power to annul or to evade it.' 8
The dissenting opinion' 9 of Mr. Justice Field argued that the federal

government was constitutionally incapable of interfering with state
judicial officers. To this argument the majority gave a most significant
reply. It said in effect that it was not the character of the actor but the
character of the act which determined the classification or the' nature
of Judge Coles' conduct. Its language has a modern appeal. It is pregnant with the "new meanings" which Professor Morse has found in
Plummer v. Casey,20 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors2' and Brewer v.
Hoxie School District No. 46.22 It is a warning to those southern states
which, to avoid the effect of Brown v. Board of Educ. would surrender
16. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
17. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
18. 100 U.S. at 347.
19. Id. at 349. Ex parte Virginia was a six-two decision. Mr. Justice Clifford joined
in the dissent. Mr. Justice Hunt did not participate.
20. 148 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Tex. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d
922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957).
21. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
22. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cfr. 1956).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

the operation of public schools to private institutions and private agencies. Mr. Justice Strong wrote,
It was insisted during the argument on behalf of the petitioner that Congress cannot
punish a State judge for his official acts; and it was assumed that Judge Coles,
selecting the jury as he did, was performing a judicial act. This assumption cannot
be admitted. Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined
by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county
judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have

been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. It often
is given to county commissioners or supervisors, or assessors. In former times, the
selection was made by the sheriff. In such cases, it surely is not a judicial act, in
any such sense as is contended for here. It is merely a ministerial act, as much so

as the act of a sheriff holding an execution, in determining upon what piece of
property he will make a levy, or the act of a roadmaster in selecting laborers to
work upon the roads. That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference.
So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, etc. Is their election or their appointment
23
a judicial act?

The court's fear of finding federal interference with judicial acts is
hard to understand. The state itself is not immune from the United
States Constitution. Neither are its legislative nor its executive officers.
There is no reason why an aura of immunity should envelop its judicial
officers even in the performance of judicial functions. Be that as it may,
the words of the Court in 1879 suggest some "liberal" answers to some
modern problems and foreshadow the shape of things to come.
If our criterion for judicial action is the character of the act and not
the character of the actor, might the same not be said of state action?
And if the act would be offensive even if "the duty of selecting jurors
might have been entrusted to private persons" can the state escape the
strictures of the fourteenth amendment by its abdication of customary
state functions? Can it immunize itself from the fifteenth amendment2 4
by giving control of its primary elections to private organizations?2" Can
it deed the ownership of its statehouse or its court houses to private
parties and disclaim responsibility for the discrimination found therein?
Can it avoid due process and equal protection by surrendering the operation of its parks and beaches and transportation facilities? Can it discharge its duty to integrate public schools by removing itself from the
field of education? There are certain functions customarily performed by
a state or a county or a municipality and when these functions are sur23.

100 U.S. 339, 348.

24. The fifteenth amendment provides, "The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
25. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), discussed infra p. 213; See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
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rendered to private agencies the very surrender itself must be state
action, and the state must continue to bear responsibility for the execution of those functions. Can we not draw such a conclusion from Mr.
Justice Strong's dictum in Ex parte Virginia? There are also certain
functions which the states have undertaken to perform. Perhaps they
are not what we once called "governmental" functions, but they have
been performed by the state. They have become impressed with the
indelible mark of their state origin, and the state cannot abdicate these
functions without assuming responsibility for any subsequent "private"
discrimination in the discharge thereof.
I am aware, to be sure, that the Supreme Court has lampooned the
distinctions drawn between governmental and proprietary functions. I
recall what Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with respect to another article of
the Constitution, wrote in concluding the Court's opinion in New York
v. United States:26
So we decide enough when we reject limitations upon the taxing power of Congress
derived from such untenable criteria as 'proprietary' against 'governmental' activities of the States, or historically sanctioned activities of government, or activities
conducted merely for profit, and find no restriction upon Congress to include the
States in levying a tax exacted equally from private persons upon the same subject
matter.

I would not revive those nagging niceties by which courts were accustomed to distinguish governmental and proprietary functions. What
is suggested is that for the purpose of due process and equal protection
all distinctions be discarded. There is a logical consistency between Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's reasoning in New York v. United States and the
Court's refusal in Ex parte Virginia to garb Judge Coles in a robe of
judicial immunity. For is it not obvious that a state can act only through
its agents, its executive, its legislature, its courts, its administrative
tribunals, and whether the act be called sovereign or proprietary, public
or personal, whether it be general or private legislation, whether it be
the operation of bus lines, or parks or schools or restaurant facilities,
whether in so acting the state competes with private enterprises, it is
nonetheless state action? And if it is the kind of act customarily done
by a state, or an enterprise which the state has originated or once administered, the state cannot shirk responsibility by deeding or leasing
the functions to private concessionaires. I would submit that this does
no more to state action than the Court's dictum in Ex parte Virginia
does to judicial action.
Might we not suggest, therefore, that the search is not for state action,
at least not as the word is defined by Mr. Webster, but rather for state
26. 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1946).
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participation, state responsibility, state favor, state origin, state preference. It does not follow that we must conclude, as one author suggests,27
that private activities of private origin might grow so immense as to
assume public (and, therefore, I suppose, state) proportions or become
so affected with a public interest as to impose responsibility upon the
state for its operation even without state intervention.
Professor Horowitz suggests, for example, that if the Ford Foundation
were to pursue a policy of racial discrimination it would be a denial of
equal protection." There is a semblance of support for this reasoning
in Marsh v. Alabama,29 but there is a danger too. Pushed to its "dryly
logical extreme" this reasoning would require overruling the Civil Rights
Cases.30 Every trust, every foundation is touched with a public interest.
Need we be reminded of Mr. Justice Robert's warning in Nebbia v. New
York" that there is no closed category of businesses affected with a
public interest?
The Civil Rights Cases
What has been said thus far presupposes the distinction drawn, four
years after Ex parte Virginia, between state action and private action.
It is on the pivot of the Civil Rights Cases that Professor Morse's article
turns. The Civil Rights Cases2 held unconstitutional a federal statute
which prescribed criminal sanctions for refusing hotel accommodations
for reasons of race or color. State law, in these cases, was silent on the
subject. In holding that the fourteenth amendment is not concerned with
private invasions of private rights, the Court speaking through Mr.
Justice Bradley, said,
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment .

.

. is prohibitory in its character,

and prohibitory upon the States....
27. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. Calif. L. Rev. 208 (1957).
28. Ibid.
29. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). This case held the state could not, consistently with the
first and fourteenth amendments, impose a criminal punishment upon a person who undertook, contrary to the wishes of the town's management, to distribute religious literature
on the premises of a company-owned town. While Mr. Justice Black did note that the
private town assumed public responsibilities and became affected with something akin
to a public interest, the critical facts were that the appellant was arrested by a state
sheriff, prosecuted by a state attorney, and convicted by a state court for the violation
of a state statute. Surely then, there was state action. The holding of Marsh v. Alabama with respect to religious liberty is almost a perfect analogue to the Court's holding
with respect to racial discrimination in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) discussed
infra p. 211.
30. Note 13 supra.
31. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
32. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion
of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment. It has a deeper
and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State action
of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law,
33
or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.

The Justice added that private invasion of private rights is not unconstitutional unless the wrongdoer is "protected in these wrongful acts
by some shield of State law or State authority, '34 and that the "abrogation and denial of rights ...

for which the States alone were or could be

seminal and fundamental wrong which was
responsible, was the great
' 35
intended to be remedied.
The holding of the Civil Rights Cases is cast in sharper relief by the
dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan. He argued that congressional legislation proscribing discrimination may assume a direct and primary character and may operate upon the states, their officers and agents and also
upon such individuals and corporationsas exercise public functions and
wield power and authority under the state. His argument is that the
states have the right to legislate respecting all businesses affected with a
public interest, and that by reason of the public nature of the innkeeper's
employment he is forbidden to discriminate against any person seeking
admission as a guest.
Mr. Justice Harlan's argument bears a curious resemblance to the public interest test proposed by Professor Horowitz.36 The latter is a refined
echo of the former. Since the Harlan dissent is the antithesis of the
majority's holding, it is difficult to reconcile the public interest test
with the Civil Rights Cases. The Civil Rights Cases certainly require
some affirmative activity or active responsibility imputable to the state.
That being so it is reasonable to conclude that the public interest test
would require the eventual overruling of the Civil Rights Cases. And it
is reasonable to predict that the test would beget a weird progeny of
cases drawing shallow shades of distinction between purely private
activity and activity affected with a public interest. I rather suspect, recalling the line of cases from Munn v. Illinois3 7 to Nebbia v. New York,3"
that the terminal point would be the classification of all private foundations, private trusts or private enterprises as foundations, trusts, or enterprise affected with a public interest. And if that is done then the word
"state" might just as well be erased from the fourteenth amendment.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Note 27 supra.
94 U.S. 113 (1876).

38.

291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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The alternative is to require a finding of active state responsibility for
the fourteenth amendment to operate. This responsibility need not
emanate from direct and primary action by the state, but may spring
from the fact that the activity originated with the state, or received
state sponsorship, state aid or state encouragement or, from the fact that
the state carried the discriminatory enterprise into execution.
At any rate the holding and dicta of the Court in Ex parte Virginia and
in the Civil Rights Cases permit the fixing of some categories of state
action under the fourteenth amendment. It was safe enough in 1882 and
is still safe today to say that the following three propositions are acceptable to the Supreme Court. The cases decided since 1882 have
served simply to perfect the classification.
CATEGORIES OF STATE ACTION

State Origin-StateExecution
A state statute or rule of common law which is in itself discriminatory
and which with its discriminatory features is enforced or applied by a
state officer violates the fourteenth amendment. This is state participation in the fullest. The discrimination has its origin in state law and it
is executed by state officers. Strauder v. West Virginia discountenanced
just such a situation and the rule of Strauder was readily accepted as
settled law by Virginia v. Rives" and Ex parte Virginia. The execution
may be the work of any agent of the state, legislative, executive or judicial, and it remains state action whether the agent exercises his authority
at the state, county or municipal level of government. It is sufficient that
the agent's authority has its ultimate source in state government.
Private Origin-State Execution
When state law is silent or even when state law prohibits discriminatory practices, but a state officer performing his state assigned duties
is guilty of discriminatory conduct, there is state participation, state
action and, therefore, a denial of due process and equal protection. This
is the ultimate effect of Ex parte Virginia. Although in Ex parte Virginia
state law was silent, Mr. Justice Strong's implication was clear that the
result would be the same even though the state agent acted in violation
of state law. It is enough that the officer or agent acted under color of
his office, that he was able to do what he did only because he held state
office or state employment. Thus, the state is not the author of the
discrimination, that is to say, there is no state statute, common-law rule,
judicial rule or executive order which would require the exclusion of
Negroes. The discrimination emanates from the individual; it is con39.

100 U.S. 313 (1879).
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ceived in the individual's personal prejudices. Had he given vent to his
bias in the operation of a private restaurant or a private establishment
his discrimination would be free of constitutional restraints. We would
then have the Civil Rights Cases. But if he practices his private prejudices under color of his state office the state must assume responsibility
because a state agent has executed the discriminatory practice.
Shelley v. Kraemer" is perhaps a clearer illustration of this principle.
In Shelley the discrimination had its origin in private covenants privately
arrived at. The real estate covenants alone were discriminatory, excluding Negroes from the use and occupancy of the land so encumbered.
The Supreme Court held that a state court could not, consistently with
the fourteenth amendment, enforce the covenants. Though privately conceived, the discrimination was abetted, buttressed, acted upon, and executed by a state officer. There was, therefore, state responsibility for
the discrimination. "It is clear," wrote Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, "that
but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full
panoply of state power, petitioners would4 have been free to occupy the
properties in question without restraint." '
It might be argued that Ex parte Virginia is a more "liberal" decision
than Shelley v. Kraemer. In Shelley, state law sanctioned the restrictive
covenants. In Ex parte Virginia it was assumed that state law forbade
the exclusion of Negroes from the jury. We might even argue that in
Ex parte Virginia there was no state action at all but rather a failure
to act. The state failed to enact legislation or to take appropriate measures to bring to an end the discriminatory practices of its agent. But
there was, nevertheless, state responsibility because the state put the
officer in a position to discriminate. The Court borrowed, as it were, the
"but for" rule sometimes employed as a test of negligence. But for the
fact that the state put Judge Coles in a position to discriminate, there
would have been no exclusion of Negroes; and but for the active intervention of the state courts, said Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in Shelley v.
Kraemer, the negro purchasers would have enjoyed the unmolested occupancy of their homes. Or, perhaps, we have in these cases an overextended respondeat superior doctrine with responsibility imputable to
the state even when the state agent or servant acts in excess of his
authority or outside the course of his employment.
State Origin--PrivateExecution
When the state statute or rule of common law is per se discriminatory,
but the offensive act is that of a private individual, there is nonetheless
a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Here the discrimination is
40.
41.

334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 19.
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created by the state and imposed upon the individual who, thus restrained, can refuse to discriminate only at the risk of violating state law.
Both Strauder v. West Virginia and the Civil Rights Cases conceded,
though neither case so held, the constitutional responsibility of the state
present in such a situation. There is, because of the holding in the Civil
Rights Cases, an inherent difficulty here. Might we not envisage a scene
wherein the state law requires discrimination but the individual, who in
his private capacity discriminates, would have done so regardless of
state law? Suppose, for example, a state statute forbade innkeepers to
lodge colored and white people indiscriminately. May the innkeeper defend by arguing that he would not have offered accommodations to
Negroes even in the absence of the state law? It is here incumbent
upon the court to declare the state statute unconstitutional, but after
the statute has been nullified, any discrimination by the individual
would, under the Civil Rights Cases, be immune.
In this category of cases concerned with "state origin-private execution" we should advert to the situation wherein the state is not the source
of the discrimination itself but rather the source of the activity or enterprise which is involved in the discrimination. In cases of this type Professor Morse seems to have found his "new meanings" for state action.
While there is no landmark Supreme Court decision in point, might we
return to the "perfect equality" and the "character of the act, rather than
the character of the actor" reasoning of Ex parte Virginia already discussed? Might we also revert to the "but for" rule of both Ex parte
Virginia and Shelley v. Kraemer? We speak now of instances where the
state entrusts the enterprise to private entrepreneurs and the latter alone
are guilty of discrimination. Shall the state share responsibility? Has
the state participated in the discrimination? State participation may
arise by reason of state ownership of property, or by granting state
preferences or by favoring with privileges those who embark upon a
course of discriminatory conduct. Unless this transfixes state responsibility, it seems to me, we have not achieved the "perfect equality of
civil rights" of which Mr. Justice Strong wrote. I would submit that
the Supreme Court admitted as much in the line of cases beginning with
Smith v. Allwight 42 in 1944, running through Rice v. Elmore4 3 and

Baskin v. Brown44 and culminating in Terry v. Adams4" in 1953.
In Smith v. Allwright the Court held that the exclusion, by political
parties, of Negroes from participation in state primary elections violated
the fifteenth amendment. The political parties were actually performing
42.
43.
44.

321 U.S. 649 (1944).
165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).

45.

345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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state functions pursuant to state law (which, however, did not itself
require the exclusion) under state supervision and subject to statutory
control. The Court stated that every part of the machinery for choosing
federal, state or municipal officials became a part of the constitutional
restraints embodied in the fifteenth amendment. We thought we had
witnessed the demise of the "white primaries."
Rice v. Elmore was the Court's reply to South Carolina's answer to
Smith v. Allwright. After the Smith case South Carolina repealed every
trace of statutory control and transferred the conduct of primary elections to "private" organizations, the political parties, unfettered by state
supervision. Rice v. Elmore responded firmly that the political parties
had become state institutions, governmental agencies through which the
sovereign power of the state was exercised and that no election machinery
could be sustained if its purpose or effect was to deny Negroes, on
account of their race, an effective voice in governmental affairs. Baskin
v. Brown was substantially and essentially the same case. Both*were
decisions by United States Courts of Appeal but are properly taken in
conjunction with Supreme Court decisions because the complete reasoning of both cases was affirmatively accepted by the Court in Terry v.
Adams. This was the case of the Jaybird Democratic Association, which
masqueraded as a private club, but which was substantially identified
with the regular Democratic Party. Its exclusion of negro participation
in primary elections, was, therefore, unconstitutional under the reasoning
of Rice v. Elmore. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, declared
that facts and findings were wholly identical with those of Rice.
General or primary elections, fashioned as they are by the Constitution itself for the selection of governmental officers, reach to the very
sovereignty of the state. It might be said that an election is per se a governmental or state function. Indeed, the Constitution entrusts the supervision of elections to the states.46 It may well be that the matter of
discrimination in elections should be kept in a closed corner by itself.
But this, it seems to me, is simply another way of saying that discrimination with respect to elections violates the fifteenth amendment while all
other types of discrimination come under the interdict of the fourteenth
amendment. It is a distinction without a difference because it is state
action rather than private action which is proscribed by both amendments. It is also true that there was obvious and deliberate evasion of
constitutional obligations in the Rice, Baskin, and Terry cases. In this
last case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, spoke of the "subversion" of the Constitution. But the Court's opinion found that the transfer
of electoral functions would be unconstitutional if the purpose or effect
was disfranchisement of the Negro.
46. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.
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It would follow, therefore, that despite the abdication of the state
function, in good faith and without intent to discriminate, state responsibility continues. Here again, but for the surrender there would have
been no discrimination. Here the very act of abdication is state action.
The enterprise or function has its origin in the state though its execution
is accomplished by the individual. There is state participation because
the activity originated in the state.
It is only a half step from Rice v. Elmore to a case wherein a state
surrenders to individual management a facility it has itself created or
operated. There is no particular virtue in adhering to the discredited
distinctions between sovereign or proprietary, governmental or competitive functions. But for the state's surrender, the discrimination would
never have quickened.
This is not to say that state responsibility is wholly a matter of origin
within the state. State responsibility will also attach when state favor or
state preference is given the guilty enterprise. It is surely reasonable to
suggest that the state is forbidden to encourage or assist those who
would discriminate or to grant them the use, to the exclusion of other
citizens, of its lands or the benefit of its state powers. The Supreme
Court has not yet entertained a case of this type. It is unfortunate that
it declined the opportunity in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.4 and
it is understandable why Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black
published their preference for the granting of certiorari.48
The recognition of state origin, state favor or state preference or the
acceptance of a "but for" rule as a test of state responsibility might well
impose almost unlimited responsibility upon the state. Noting the fact
that it is most common today for private clubs to incorporate, consider
the case of corporate activity. A corporation is said to be a creature of
the legislature. It exists by grace of the state. Might it not be argued
that any time a corporation discriminates, responsibility is traceable to
the state because the corporation owes its existence to the state? Or
would this be akin to inculpating the parent for the sins of the child?
Or might it be said that the corporation itself does not discriminate but
rather the individuals within the corporation? Accepting for the moment
the latter we would certainly be piling Pelion on Ossa; we would have an
agency twice removed; and perhaps this would be attenuating the fiction
to the breaking point. However logical it might be, it would not seem
to be in the offing either by the Supreme Court or any of the lower
federal courts. Recognizing that logic is not a hallmark of Constitutional
47. 299 N.Y. 512 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
48. Announcement of a particular Justice's opinion regarding a denial of certiorari is
rather rare.
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construction, I should think that something more than mere favor of
state incorporation must be present in order to have state participation.
NEw OR OLD MEANINGS

Now, may we ask what "new meanings" of state action are to be
found in the trio of cases reviewed by Professor Morse: Derrington v.
Plummer,49 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors,' and Brewer v. Hoxie
School District No. 46.51 The facts in each are given in ample detail in
the preceding article.
Derrington v. Plummer
Derrington is at the center point between the Civil Rights Cases and
active state participation by state officers. Derringtonillustrates the principle of state origin. Is it not, however, enough to note in Derrington
and in the district court's opinion in Plummer v. Casey 52 that the lessee
was operating on state owned property, in a county courthouse? Is not
state ownership enough to fix tate responsibility? Should a state be free
to permit discrimination on state lands or be free to permit state property
to be used in such a way as to deny to any class equal enjoyment of the
use? Is it not incumbent upon the state to guarantee that the property,
leased but still owned by the state, shall be available for use by all the
citizens of the state?
If public schools cannot be utilized by private citizens for the conduct
of religious classes53 certainly 'they cannot be used for the pursuit of
discriminatory practices by individual citizens. What is true of state
owned schools must also be true of state owned parks, state owned transportation and state owned buildings.
Plummer v. Casey is notable on an6ther score. It has a naive and
narrow twist to it. Decided almbst two years after Brown v. Board of
Educ. at a time when the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
Fergusonwas as dead as both the door nail and Mr. Marley, it conjured
up Marley's ghost and held that there was a denial of due process only
because comparable cafeteria facilities were not available to Negroes
within the courthouse building. Paradoxically it also decided, aping
Brown v. Board of Educ.54 to make haste slowly in formulating its decree.
The court concluded,
49. 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 '(195,7).
50. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
5i. 238 F.2d 9i(8th Cir.. 1956).
52. 148 F. Supp. 326 (S-D. Tex..1955)
53. McC61lum v. *Board of Educ., 333 U.S. -203' (1948).
54. 349 U.S. 294 (1954). In this case, the Court formulated its decree based -on its lP*rior
decision. See note 6 supra.
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under the circumstances here prevailing, the defendant Derrington, subsequent to
the date hereafter mentioned, may not continue to exclude members of the colored
race . ..
By reason of the fact that changes in many of the policies and practices now prevailing in the operation of the cafeteria may be desired by the defendants, the entry
of an injunction will... be withheld for a period of ninety days. 55

One can understand the deliberation and delay required to integrate
public schools. It entails among other things the realignment of school
districts, reappointment of classes and the reassignment of teachers. But
it is impossible to understand why ninety days or ten days or even one
day should be required to accommodate Negroes in a restaurant or a
cafeteria.
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors
Professor Morse has sifted Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors quite
carefully. But, it seems to me, the entire story is tersely told in the
per curiarn opinion5" of the Supreme Court. 57 And, it seems to me,
this is Ex parte Virginia revisited. Here the origin of the trust was
private, it is true, but the state had acted upon it and within it. The
city officials who administered the trust were able to do so only because
they were city officials. The ornate dissent of Judge Mussmano in In re
Girard's Estate recited a "plethora of state activity" but the Supreme
Court said all that need be said.
The Board which operates Girard College is an agency of the State of Pennsylvania.
Therefore, even though the Board was acting as a trustee, its refusal to admit Foust
58
and Felder to the college because they were Negroes was discrimination by the State.

Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46
In Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46, a school board, intent upon
obeying the mandate of Brown v. Board of Educ., sought an injunction
to restrain certain citizens from conspiring by mass violence to obstruct
the board in enforcing desegregation. The injunction was granted. Professor Morse suggests that here the fourteenth amendment was given
positive application, that the court imposed a duty upon the board to
take affirmative action rather than a restraint upon discriminatory conduct, and that the board was acting in violation of state law which sanctioned segregation. I would question whether the Brewer case is related
to state action at all.
55.

148 F. Supp. at 329-30.

56. It is not correct to imply, as Professor Morse seems to do, that a per curiam opinion
reversing a lower court is an acceptance of the lower court's dissenting opinion. This is
no more true than the somewhat common misconception that a denial of certiorari by
the Supreme Court is tantamount to an affirmance of the lower court's holding.
57. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
58.

Id. at 231.
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The school board was not acting in violation of state law. The state
law which required segregation was nullified by Brown v. Board of Educ.,
and Brown, not Brewer, required the school board to integrate its public
schools with "all deliberate speed." The Brewer court did not impose an
affirmative duty upon the board. It simply restrained the appellants from
obstructing the board in the performance of a duty which the board itself
chose to perform. The court did not require the board to adopt nondiscriminatory rules; it required those citizens who interfered with the
adoption of such rules to cease and desist.
CONCLUSION

The disintegration, if any, of the strict and conventional construction
of state action has been slight, indeed, and certainly elusive. The cases
which purport to add new meanings to the concept of state action reach
back to the liberal language of Ex parte Virginia. We have now no more
than new wine in old bottles. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors is a
mild echo of Ex parte Virginia, and Derrington v. Plummer is an advanced illustration of the principle set out in Terry v. Adams and Rice v.
Elmore. These, in turn, can also find support in Ex parte Virginia,
which will abort speculation that the states may escape Brown v. Board
of Educ. by abdicating the supervision of 'public education.
Though it has never been "among the last to lay the old aside," the
Supreme Court has followed the concept of state action with a certain
consistency and an adherence to tradition. There has been an adherence,
though not always disciplined, to the conventional construction. What we
have witnessed is simply the adjustment of old rules to new circumstances.

